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CELL PHONES ARE ORWELL’S TELESCREEN:
THE NEED FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION IN REAL-TIME CELL PHONE
LOCATION INFORMATION
MATTHEW DEVOY JONES*
ABSTRACT
Courts are divided as to whether law enforcement can collect cell phone location
information in real-time without a warrant under the Fourth Amendment. This Article
argues that Carpenter v. United States requires a warrant under the Fourth Amendment
prior to law enforcement’s collection of real-time cell phone location information.
Courts that have required a warrant prior to the government’s collection of real-time
cell phone location information have considered the length of surveillance. This
should not be a factor. The growing prevalence and usage of cell phones and cell phone
technology, the original intent of the Fourth Amendment, and United States Supreme
Court case law are the deciding factors.
Research has shown that a cell phone can be located through its basic functioning
as it automatically connects to a growing number of cell sites. The fact that nearly all
Americans have a cell phone and carry it on their person, makes a cell phone’s location
that of the phone’s user, essentially acting as a monitoring device. Permitting law
enforcement to collect this location information in real-time without a warrant under
the Fourth Amendment violates the principles of the Amendment, which is to curb
arbitrary government power. Twenty-first century United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence furthers this argument. The Court recently found, in Carpenter v. United
States, that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their physical
movements as captured through historical cell cite location information (“CSLI”). The
same rationale in deciding Carpenter also applies to the real-time CSLI and GPS data
emanating from one’s phone: neither United States v. Knotts nor the third-party
doctrine are applicable to real-time cell phone monitoring.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Mary Ann and Kent Jeffries, a married couple from southern Texas, were
celebrating their twentieth wedding anniversary. 1 The couple traveled to Chicago for
a long weekend, leaving their two teenage children to bear the Texas summer heat.
Both Mr. and Mrs. Jeffries took their smartphones on the trip.
Michael Rivera-Guerrero, a life-long resident of the Pilsen neighborhood in
Chicago, was recently laid-off from his job as an assembler at a local factory. A month
earlier he promised his son that the two would go to a Sox-Cubs game at Guaranteed
Rate Field. To keep his promise, Mr. Rivera-Guerrero decided it was in his best
interest to turn to a life of crime. Rivera-Guerrero always carried his smartphone on
his person.
Prior to leaving their hotel on Michigan Avenue, Mrs. Jeffries put her phone in “do
not disturb” mode. She did not want to be bothered by any notifications while visiting
the Windy City. Mr. Jeffries, ever the workaholic, turned the volume to one-hundred
percent on his phone. He did not want to miss any calls, texts, or emails from work.
He also launched his Maps mobile application to direct the couple to the closest place
to grab a cup of coffee before heading to Millennium Park.
Earlier that morning, Mr. Rivera-Guerrero took the “L” to downtown Chicago. He
waited outside of a Starbucks until it was nearly empty. While he was inside
demanding money from the cash register, Mr. and Mrs. Jeffries were standing outside
of the Starbucks. As Mr. Rivera-Guerrero hurried his way out of Starbucks with a

1

This fictional story demonstrates a plausible scenario that could arise from the current
state of data privacy law in the United States.
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book bag full of cash, the Jeffries noted something was wrong and left to grab coffee
elsewhere.
The Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) was immediately made aware of the
robbery. To assist in their investigation, the CPD obtained a court order to access
location information from cell phone service providers that would identify cell phones
that were within the vicinity of the Starbucks at the time of the robbery. Due to the
density of downtown Chicago, the CPD was able to get location information from
multiple cell phones, including those of Mr. Rivera-Guerrero and the Jeffries. After
obtaining the numbers of the individuals that were within the vicinity of the Starbucks
at the time of the robbery, the CPD obtained a separate court order asking for the realtime location information for those same numbers—again, including Mr. RiveraGuerrero and Mr. and Mrs. Jeffries.
Meanwhile, the Jeffries continued exploring the city. After grabbing dinner the
following evening, the couple decided to attend Guaranteed Rate Field for a Sox-Cubs
game. Unbeknownst to them, Mr. Rivera-Guerrero and his son were also in
attendance—facts known by the CPD. The CPD arrested both Mr. and Mrs. Jeffries,
as well as Mr. Rivera-Guerrero, for questioning.
The CPD revealed to Mr. Jeffries during the questioning that it had evidence that
he was at the scene of the robbery. The CPD also revealed that it had evidence that he
frequented locations within Chicago often frequented by tourists, asking whether he
was there to prey on tourists. Police obtained this information from Mr. Jeffries’ use
of his smartphone’s Maps app that he used for walking directions, which utilized GPS.
His whereabouts were also obtained from cell-site locators, to which his smartphone
connected whenever it was searching for a connection, receiving or sending a call,
text, or email.
In a separate room, the CPD revealed to Mrs. Jeffries that it had evidence that she
was at the scene of the robbery. The CPD also revealed that it had evidence that she
visited locations within Chicago often frequented by tourists, asking whether she was
there to prey on tourists. Police obtained this information from Mrs. Jeffries’
smartphone connecting to cell-site locators, to which her smartphone connected in the
same way her husband’s did.2
The CPD allowed the Jeffries to leave the station after understanding that they
were in town celebrating their wedding anniversary and it was Mr. Rivera-Guerrero
who committed the robbery. Though their anniversary was ruined and the couple
missed their flight home, neither Mr. nor Mrs. Jeffries pressed charges.
Weeks later, Mr. Rivera-Guerrero’s attorney filed a motion to suppress the historic
and real-time cell phone location information, arguing that the evidence was obtained
unlawfully. His attorney argued that the CPD should have obtained a warrant before
they began tracking Mr. Rivera-Guerrero’s smartphone. The court agreed that the
historic cell phone location information was obtained unlawfully under Carpenter v.
United States—but what about the real-time cell phone location information? Should
a warrant be required when the government utilizes an individual’s cell phone to locate
or track that individual in real-time? The pre-Carpenter courts have been divided on

2 Though Mrs. Jeffries had her phone in “do not disturb mode,” all texts and calls—likely
from her two teenage boys—that she had received during this time resulted in the collection of
her location.
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whether the Fourth Amendment provides individuals with a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their cell phone’s real-time location information.3
This Article argues that a warrant under the Fourth Amendment must be obtained
prior to collection of real-time location information from a user’s cell phone. Section
II discusses cell phones, cell phone location information, and how the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment applies to such information. Section II also discusses United
States Supreme Court decisions regarding electronic surveillance of individuals by the
government.
Section III discusses the different approaches that twenty-first century courts have
taken when deciding whether the Fourth Amendment applies to law enforcement’s
collection of cell phone location information. Section IV explains why a warrant based
on probable cause is required to collect such information, focusing on legal and public
policy arguments. Section V provides two solutions to ensure individuals have Fourth
Amendment protection in the cell phone location information emanating from their
phone in real-time.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE USE OF REAL-TIME CELL PHONE LOCATION INFORMATION
TO TRACK INDIVIDUALS
Law enforcement’s use of real-time cell phone location information to track
individuals’ movements under the Fourth Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause
was explicitly left as an open issue in a recent United States Supreme Court case,
Carpenter v. United States.4 This Section briefly discusses the pervasiveness of cell
phones. This Section also discusses background information on cell phone location
information including how it functions and its precision. The Fourth Amendment and
its applicability to tracking an individual using real-time cell phone location
information will then be discussed. Lastly, this Section discusses United States
Supreme Court decisions relating to electronic surveillance.
A. Cell Phones Today
The prevalence of cell phones in America is continuing to grow. 5 Today, nearly all
Americans—95%—own a cell phone of some kind.6 A vast majority of Americans—
around 80%—own smartphones.7 Smartphones are cell phones with a broad range of
functions, acting as minicomputers that just so happen to be used as telephones. 8 “They
3 For courts finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in real-time cell phone location
information, see United States v. Ellis, 270 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Tracey v.
Florida, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014). But see United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012 (6th Cir.
2017); In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
4

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).

5
Mobile
Fact
Sheet,
PEW
RESEARCH
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/#.
6

CENTER

(Feb.

5,

2018),

Id.

7

Id.; see also DELOITTE, 2017 GLOBAL MOBILE CONSUMER SURVEY: US EDITION 7 (2017),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/technology-mediatelecommunications/us-tmt-2017-global-mobile-consumer-survey-executive-summary.pdf.
8 See Smartphone, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/smartphone (last visited April 8, 2019); see also Riley, 134 S. Ct. at
2480; In re Smartphone Geolocation Data, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 137.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss4/6

4

CELL PHONES ARE ORWELL’S TELESCREEN

2019]

527

could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape
recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.”9 For instance,
one-in-five American adults use smartphones as their primary means of online access
at home, making cell phones even more necessary for these individuals. 10 To utilize
these broad range of functions, smartphone users download mobile applications
(“apps”), the average of which is thirty-three per user.11
As these numbers show, it is nearly impossible to live in the United States without
a cell phone.12 Individuals use cell phones while shopping, watching television,
relaxing, eating (both at home and at restaurants), and while in public spaces (driving
or walking).13 This means that cell phone users usually keep the phone on their person,
rarely leaving its presence.14
To purchase and use a cell phone, individuals must agree to legal terms and
conditions, ranging from the cell phone provider and manufacturer to an app creator.15
In fact, 91% of users “accept legal terms and conditions without reading them before
installing apps, registering Wi-Fi hotspots, accepting updates, and signing on to online
services such as video streaming.”16 However, even if read, the vast majority of terms
and conditions are too complex for many people to understand. 17 In fact, of the four
largest service providers in the United States, only one has a privacy policy that states
that location information may be disclosed to the government when served with lawful
process.18 Of further concern, users do not consider accepting terms and conditions a

9
10

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
PEW RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 5.

11

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (citing Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center et al. as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petiioner in No. 13-132, p. 9). An app is a software program that is
downloaded and accessed on a smartphone, or other device connected to the internet such as a
tablet or smart TV. Understanding Mobile Apps, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 2017),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0018-understanding-mobile-apps.
12

DELOITTE, supra note 7, at 13.

13

Id. at 3.

14

See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (citing HARRIS INTERACTIVE, 2013 Mobile Consumer Habits
Study (June 2013)); United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 348 (4th Cir. 2015); United States
v. Ellis, 270 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2017); In re Application for Telephone
Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1023–25 (N.D. Cal.
2015); Tracey v. Florida, 152 So. 3d 504, 524 (Fla. 2014).
15

DELOITTE, supra note 7, at 12.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Verizon, AT&T, T-Mobile, and Sprint are the four largest cell service providers in the
United States, as of the second fiscal quarter of 2018. Mike Dano, How Verizon, AT&T, TMobile, Sprint and More Stacked up in Q2 2018: The Top 7 Carriers, FIERCE WIRELESS (Aug.
13, 2018), https://www.fiercewireless.com/wireless/how-verizon-at-t-t-mobile-sprint-andmore-stacked-up-q2-2018-top-7-carriers. Of the four, only T-Mobile’s terms state that location
information may be shared with the government. Privacy Policy & Personal Information, TMOBILE, https://www.t-mobile.com/responsibility/privacy/privacy-policy (last visited Nov. 2,
2018) (stating that T-Mobile “may disclose, without your consent, the approximate location of
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barrier to cell phone use given the absence of choice.19 As a result, many cell phone
users are left without another option but to accept these terms and conditions, as doing
otherwise is unthinkable in modern society. Cell phone use and ownership will likely
continue to grow, making the issue of warrantless collection of real-time cell phone
location information a mounting problem.
B. The Development and Use of Cell Phone Location Information
A cell phone’s location can be tracked through cell site location information
(“CSLI”) or global positioning system (“GPS”) data.20 Obtaining location information
through either of these methods reveals details about an individual that is not likely to
be obtained otherwise.21
Cellular service providers maintain a network of radio “base stations” to and from
which a cell phone sends and receives radio signals. 22 These base stations are towers
or antennae.23 A cell site, in turn, is a specific portion of the tower or antennae “which
detects the radio signal emanating from a cell phone and connects the cell phone to
a wireless device to a governmental entity or law enforcement authority when we are served
with lawful process.”).
19

DELOITTE, supra note 7, at 12.

20 Cell Phone Location Tracking or CSLI: A Guide for Criminal Defense Attorneys, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/files/2017/10/30/cell_phone_location_information
_one_pager_0.pdf. A cell-site simulator (“CSS”)—also referred to as a StingRay, Hailstorm, or
TriggerFish—is another means that the government can use to collect real-time cell phone
location information. It is a device that mimics a service provider’s tower or antennae. Cindy
Ham, How Lambis and CSLI Litigation Mandate Warrants for Cell-Site Simulators Usage in
New York, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 509 (2017) (citing Sam Biddle, Long-Secret Stingray Manuals
Detail How Police Can Spy on Phones, THE INTERCEPT (Sept. 12, 2016),
https://theintercept.com/2016/09/12/long-secret-stingraymanuals-detail-how-police-can-spyon-phones/). As a result, it forces cell phones to transmit radio signals to the simulator, believing
that the simulator is the most attractive “base station” in the area. Id. With the CSS, the
government “‘cuts out the cellular service provider and obtains CSLI directly.’” United States
v. Ellis, 270 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (citing United States v. Lambis, 197 F.
Supp. 3d 606, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)). Though CSS is not a focus of this Article, as real-time
CSLI and GPS data is, it is still important to note that this is another means to obtain the same
information. Additionally, Bluetooth beacons also have the potential to pinpoint the location of
a cell phone and its user to a matter of inches. In re Smartphone Geolocation Data, 977 F. Supp.
2d 129, 138 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Again, this is just another means to the same end.
21 Marissa Kay, Reviving the Fourth Amendment: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in a
Cell Phone Age, 50 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 555, 573, 577 (citations omitted).
22

United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 343 (4th Cir. 2015); In re Application for
Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1013 (N.D.
Cal. 2015) (citing Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) (Part II): Geolocation
Privacy and Surveillance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland
Security, and Investigations, of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 50 (2013)
[hereinafter ECPA Hearing] (written testimony of Prof. Matt Blaze, Univ. of Pennsylvania)).
Cellular
Phone
Towers,
AM.
CANCER
SOC’Y
(May
31,
2016),
https://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancer-causes/radiation-exposure/cellular-phone-towers.html
(last visited Apr. 8, 2019); see also Graham, 796 F.3d at 343; In re Application for Telephone
Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1013 (citing ECPA
Hearing, supra note 22 (written testimony of Prof. Matt Blaze, Univ. of Pennsylvania)).
23
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the local cellular network or Internet.”24 “Although cell sites are usually mounted on
[base stations,] they can also be found on light posts, flagpoles, church steeples, or the
sides of buildings.”25 As a cell phone and its user move from place to place, the cell
phone’s signal is automatically sent to the tower that provides the best reception,
typically the nearest cell site.26 This creates CSLI.27 The resulting CSLI identifies the
precise location of the tower or antennae, and cell site at particular points in time,
approximating, within feet, the whereabouts of the cell phone’s user. 28
The government may locate and track a person by collecting two types of CSLI,
historical CSLI or real-time CSLI.29 Historical CSLI refers to where an individual’s
cell phone has been located at some point in the past.30 As will be mentioned below,
this was the subject of Carpenter and is not the subject of this Article, though the legal
arguments related to historical CSLI are still important. On the other hand, real-time
CSLI refers to where an individual’s cell phone is presently located.31
The precision of real-time CSLI varies based upon the number of cell sites in the
area.32 If the cell phone is within range of three cell sites, known as triangulation, the
location discerned from this data is nearly as precise as GPS.33 In highly populated
areas, such as cosmopolitan areas like downtown Chicago, a cell phone can connect
to microcells and femtocells, in addition to base stations, which can reveal location

24 In re Application for Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F.
Supp. 3d at 1014 (citing ECPA Hearing, supra note 22 (written testimony of Prof. Matt Blaze,
Univ. of Pennsylvania)); see also Types of Cell Sites, STEEL IN THE AIR,
https://www.steelintheair.com/cell-site-types/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018); see also AM. CANCER SOC’Y,
supra note 23.
25

26

See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211; Graham, 796 F.3d at 343.

27

See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211; Graham, 796 F.3d at 343; In re Application for
Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1014 (citing
ECPA Hearing, supra note 22 (written testimony of Prof. Matt Blaze, Univ. of Pennsylvania)).
28

Graham, 796 F.3d at 343; In re Application for Telephone Information Needed for a
Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 1014 (citing ECPA Hearing, supra note 22 (written
testimony of Prof. Matt Blaze, Univ. of Pennsylvania)).
29 See Steven M. Harkins, CSLI Disclosure: Why Probable Cause Is Necessary to Protect
What’s Left of the Fourth Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1875, 1882 (2011) (citing
Stephanie Lockwood, Who Knows Where You’ve Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use
of Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 308 (2004)).
30
R. Craig Curtis et al., Using Technology the Founders Never Dreamed of: Phones as
Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment, 4 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 61, 63 (2014).
31

Id.

32

Eric Pait, Find My Suspect: Tracking People in the Age of Cell Phones, 2 GEO. L. TECH.
REV. 155, 157 (2017); see also Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211–12 (2018).
33 See Pait, supra note 32, at 158; see also United States v. Stimler, 864 F.3d 253, 260 (3rd
Cir. 2017); In re Application for Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation,
119 F. Supp. 3d at 1023 (citing ECPA Hearing, supra note 22 (written testimony of Prof. Matt
Blaze, Univ. of Pennsylvania)).
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information within the nearest foot.34 This means the greater the concentration of cell
sites, the smaller the coverage area.35 A record number of cell sites were in operation
at the end of 2017, providing increased precision of real-time CSLI.36
Like CSLI, the government can track an individual using their cell phone’s internal
GPS locator to obtain a “precise, real-time location of the device without using CSLI
and without its user knowing.”37 For necessary background, the GPS system used in
cell phones comes from twenty-four GPS satellites in the United States.38 Radio
signals are received by a cell phone from this system of satellites, and then interpreted
by programs to provide highly accurate location data. 39 GPS in cell phones was first
used to improve emergency response by giving emergency operators the exact location
of the person in need rather than relying on the reporter’s estimated location. 40 Now,
however, GPS in cell phones is used for more than aiding those in need. 41
Individuals use smartphone GPS to locate dining and entertainment venues, as well
as to obtain driving or walking directions. 42 Many of the apps that users have on their
phone require GPS in order for that app to function. 43 For example, when a user
activates the GPS on his or her phone, it reports back real-time traffic conditions after
crowdsourcing the speed of all cell phones on any particular road.44 Law enforcement

34 Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment: A Question of
Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 677, 710–711 (2011); see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211–
12; United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 540, 542 (11th Cir. 2015).
35

Freiwald, supra note 34; see also Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211–12.

36

The State of Wireless 2018, CTIA (July 10, 2018) https://www.ctia.org/news/the-stateof-wireless-2018.
37

Pait, supra note 32.

38

What Is GPS?, GARMIN, http://www8.garmin.com/aboutGPS/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2019).

39

See In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129 (E.D.N.Y.

2013).
40 Ian Herbert, Where We Are with Location Tracking: A Look at the Current Technology
and the Implications on Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 422, 477
(2011).

See, e.g., Sonja Thompson, 10 Smartphone Features that I’m Pretty Darn Thankful for,
TECH REPUBLIC (Nov. 28, 2013), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/smartphones/10smartphone-features-that-im-pretty-darn-thankful-for/.
41

42 New Research Shows Consumers Want a Side of Technology with Their Meals, NAT’L
REST. ASS’N (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.restaurant.org/News-Research/News/Newresearchshows-consumers-want-a-side-of-techno; see also DELOITTE, supra note 7, at 13.
43 DJ Pangburn, How—And Why—Apple, Google, And Facebook Follow You Around in
Real Life, FAST COMPANY (Dec. 12, 2017) https://www.fastcompany.com/40477441/facebookgoogle-apple-know-where-you-are.
44 See Waze—Crowdsourcing Maps and Traffic Information, DIGITAL INNOVATION AND
TRANSFORMATION A COURSE AT HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL (Dec. 6, 2015)
https://digit.hbs.org/submission/waze-crowdsourcing-maps-and-traffic-information/; see also
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 428–29 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss4/6

8

CELL PHONES ARE ORWELL’S TELESCREEN

2019]

531

uses this “continuous, detailed, and real-time location, speed, direction, and duration
information” to obtain the whereabouts of suspected criminals or individuals.45
The accuracy and flexibility of real-time cell phone location information is an
advantage to law enforcement when investigating a crime. 46 For example, current GPS
technology typically achieves spatial resolution within about fifteen feet. 47 This
means, for example, that law enforcement could locate an individual using his or her
cell phone within approximately fifteen feet of the individual’s exact location,
including in his or her home. 48 Real-time cell phone location information also makes
it easier to collect detailed information “without incurring the commensurate costs in
dedicated employee resources, salary, benefits, [maintenance,] and overtime pay.” 49
Law enforcement can locate individuals in this manner from any location, making
such surveillance not only cheaper but vastly superior to visual surveillance because
“no one human or organization of human observers is currently capable of such
comprehensive, continuous, and accurate information regarding location and
movement monitoring.”50 While there is a potential disparity in precision between
real-time CSLI and GPS data, these two methods provide the government with the
current location of a cell phone’s user anywhere in the country based solely on his or
her cell phone number.51
C. Attached at the Hip: The Fourth Amendment and Real-Time Cell Phone Location
Information
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of United States citizens “to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”52 The Fourth Amendment also states the grounds on which the government
can perform searches and seizures: the government must obtain a warrant issued on
“probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”53 Because the Fourth
Amendment does not mention cell phones or real-time location information, an
inquiry into the Framers’ motives for drafting the Fourth Amendment and United
States Supreme Court jurisprudence is beneficial to understanding the relation
between the Fourth Amendment and real-time cell phone location information.

45 See, e.g., State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630 (N.J. 2013); Lenese C. Herbert, Challenging the
(Un)constitutionality of Governmental GPS Surveillance, 26 CRIM. JUST. 34, 34 (2011).
46

Pait, supra note 32, at 155.

47 GPS
Accuracy,
gps.gov
(Dec.
https://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/performance/accuracy/.
48

5,

2017),

Earls, 70 A.3d at 636, 639.

49

In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Location Info. of a
Specified Wireless Tel., 849 F. Supp. 2d 526, 533 (D. Md. 2011).
50

Herbert, supra note 45, at 35; see also In re Application of the U.S., 849 F. Supp. 2d at

540.
51

Pait, supra note 32, at 159.

52

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

53

Id.
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The Framers of the Amendment were influenced by government action—in
England and the American colonies—which violated personal liberties, specifically in
three cases.54 In two English cases, Entick v. Carrington and Wilkes v. Wood, the
government seized property using general warrants—warrants with no names or
places to be searched.55 The courts struck down the general warrants and judgment
was entered in favor of the plaintiffs in both cases. 56 This was a “monument of English
freedom” familiar to all Americans at the time the Constitution was adopted. 57 In the
Massachusetts Writs of Assistance case, the government searched any place where the
sought after property could be hidden without any suspicion the goods were actually
there.58 Unlike in Entick and Wilkes, the search was ruled legal and judgment was
entered in favor of the government.59 The use of general warrants in these cases and,
“as John Adams recalled, the patriot James Otis’s 1761 speech condemning writs of
assistance [were] ‘the first act[s] of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain’
and helped spark the Revolution itself.” 60 In sum, “a central aim of the Framers was
‘to place obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance.’” 61
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence gives guidance on many of the terms that the
Fourth Amendment contains. For example, a search requiring a warrant based on
probable cause occurs in two circumstances. First, a search occurs when law
enforcement trespasses on a searched person’s property, also known as a physical
intrusion.62 Second, a search occurs when a searched person’s expectation of privacy
in the thing searched is reasonable and society believes that the expectation of privacy
is reasonable.63 The Court has also defined the terms seizure and probable cause. 64 In
addition, the Court has crafted numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement
including exigent circumstances, arrests outside the home, searches incident to arrest,
inventory searches, automobiles, and street stops and frisks. 65
54

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018).

55 Entick v. Carrington (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P.); Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 19
How. St. Tr. 1153 (C.P.).
56

Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1029; Wilkes, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1153.

57

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012).

58 Writs
of Assistance Trial: 1761, JRANK ARTICLES
https://law.jrank.org/pages/2353/Writs-Assistance-Trial-1761.html.

(Mar.

59

Id.

60

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018).

61

Id. at 2214.

62

See Jones, 565 U.S. at 400; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

63

See Jones, 565 U.S. at 400; Katz, 389 U.S. at 347.

9,

2019),

64 A seizure has been defined as a “meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory
interests in that property.” Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992). Persons may also be
seized, but this is not at issue here. Probable cause has been defined as “a fair probability.”
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983).
65 Such exceptions include: exigent circumstances, arrests outside the home, searches
incident to arrest, inventory searches, automobiles, and street stops and frisks. WILLIAM J.
STUNTZ, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 328 (Edwin
Meese III et al. eds., 2005). The exception that will most likely apply to collection of a
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The Supreme Court has also confirmed that the basic purpose of the Fourth
Amendment “is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by governmental officials.” 66 “[T]he Amendment seeks to secure ‘the
privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’” 67 It “was the founding generation’s
response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era,
which[, as mentioned above,] allowed British officers to rummage through homes in
an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity.”68 Through this historical
background, it is clear that real-time cell phone location information falls within the
purview of the Fourth Amendment.
D. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment: Setting the
Stage for Real-Time Cell Phone Tracking
The United States Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
evolved, while keeping intact the Framers’ intent. This subsection focuses on three
prominent twentieth century United States Supreme Court cases that have provided
the backdrop to cell phone tracking jurisprudence, and five twenty-first century
Supreme Court cases that have set the groundwork for real-time cell phone tracking
jurisprudence. As evident from the case law below, individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their real-time cell phone location information.
1. Katz, Knotts, and Karo
The Supreme Court established the reasonable expectation standard in Katz v.
United States.69 In Katz, the petitioner challenged the government’s attachment of an
eavesdropping device to a public phone booth as a violation of his constitutional
rights.70 The Court found that a conversation is protected from unreasonable search
and seizure under the Fourth Amendment if it is made with a “reasonable expectation
of privacy.”71 Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion launched the “Katz test,” consisting
of a two-part inquiry.72 In order to determine whether a search violated a person’s
Fourth Amendment rights, courts must consider whether: (1) the individual manifested
a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search; and (2)

smartphone user’s GPS information is exigent circumstances. See United States v. Banks, 884
F.3d 998 (10th Cir. 2018). “Courts recognize the existence of exigent circumstances to justify
a warrantless search in several situation, including: to prevent the destruction of evidence, to
[ensure safety,] when police are in ‘hot pursuit’ of a fleeing suspect, or when other emergency
circumstances exist, such as the need to assist injured individuals.” Patterson v. North Carolina,
No. 5:12 cv-182-RJC, 2013 WL 170431, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 16, 2013). The standard under
exigent circumstances is a “reasonable suspicion”—a lower standard than probable cause. Id.
66

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213.

67

Id. at 2214.

68

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (emphasis added).

69

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967).

70

Id. at 348.

71

Id. at 360.

72

Id. at 360–61.
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society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.73 This test has been
applied in numerous cell phone location information cases. 74
The Supreme Court in United States v. Knotts set forth the proposition that
individuals have no expectation of privacy on public roadways.75 In Knotts, federal
agents placed a beeper into a container that was to be purchased by respondent. 76 The
agents were able to monitor the movement of the container as it moved along the
highway and eventually to respondent’s home. 77 The Court held that “[a] person
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one place to another.”78 The Court found no reasonable
expectation of privacy because the information obtained had been voluntarily
conveyed to the public by traveling on public roads. 79 This rule has effectively been
overruled beginning in United States v. Jones, and later in Carpenter.80
In United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court considered whether the installation of
a beeper in a container amounted to a search or seizure.81 Federal agents installed a
beeper on a container in order to locate the movement of the container from location
to location.82 The Court held that the installation, with the consent of the original
owner, does not invade a buyer’s privacy when the buyer had no knowledge of the
presence of the beeper.83 However, the Court found that monitoring a beeper in a
private residence violates a person’s Fourth Amendment rights because a warrant must
be obtained in order to search a house.84
2. Kyllo, Jones, Jardines, and Riley
The Supreme Court in Kyllo v. United States considered whether the use of a
thermal-imaging device aimed at a home from the street constituted a search. 85 Federal
agents used a thermal imager to determine whether heat was emanating from inside a

73

Id. at 361.

74

See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018); United States v. Ellis, 270 F.
Supp. 3d 1134 (2017); United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015); In re Application
for Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D.
Cal. 2015); United States v. Thomas, No. 3:15cr80, 2015 WL 5999313 (E.D. Va. Oct. 13, 2015);
Tracey v. Florida, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014).
75

United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280–81 (1983).

76

Id. at 277.

77

Id. at 278–79.

78

Id. at 281.

79

Id. at 281–82.

80 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012); Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2206, 2217 (2018).
81

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).

82

Id. at 708.

83

Id. at 712.

84

Id. at 718.

85

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
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house.86 The scan of the home took a few minutes and was performed from the agents’
car.87 The Court held that such behavior is a search because the government used a
device that was not in general public use “to explore details of the home that would
[have] previously been unknowable without physical intrusion.” 88
In Jones, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of “whether the attachment of a
GPS device to an individual’s vehicle, and the subsequent use of the device to track
the vehicle’s movements, constitute[d] a search under the Fourth Amendment.” 89 The
government attached a GPS device to the defendant’s vehicle without a proper warrant
and tracked the vehicle’s movements for twenty-eight days.90 Once indicted, the
defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained through the GPS device. 91
The district court suppressed the GPS data obtained while the vehicle was at the
defendant’s residence;92 however, the court admitted into evidence the data obtained
while the vehicle was on public streets, evoking Knotts.93 The circuit court for the
District of Columbia reversed on appeal, holding that the admission of the evidence
obtained by the warrantless use of a GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment. 94
Affirming the decision of the circuit court, the Supreme Court held that the attachment
of the GPS device constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment because of the
government’s “physical intrusion on an ‘effect’ for the purpose of obtaining
information[.]”95 In reaching this decision, the Court utilized the “physical trespass
test.”96 This holding ignored Knotts by affirming the decision of the circuit court,
which overruled the district court’s holding that relied on Knotts, to find that no search
occurred on public thoroughfares.97
The largest impact for cell phone location information came from the Jones
concurrences.98 In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor argued that the Katz test

86

Id.

87

Id. at 30.

88

Id. at 40.

Letter from N. Mark Rapoport, S.C. Senior Assistant Att’y Gen., to Brian Buck, Chief
of Police, 2012 WL 1260180, at *1 (2012).
89

90

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–03 (2012).

91

Id. at 403.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id. at 404.

95

Id. at 400–01.

Id.; see supra Part II.A. Although the majority applied the “physical trespass test,” the
concurring opinions focused on the “Katz test.” Jones, 565 U.S. at 413–31.
96

97

Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.

98

Cases relying on Jones include: Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018);
United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2015) (comparing Jones to historical
CSLI); Tracey v. Florida, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014); State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630 (N.J. 2013),
among other older cases. Cases distinguishing Jones include: United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d
498, 514–15 (11th Cir. 2015) (distinguishing Jones from historical CSLI); United States v.
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provides individuals more protection than the test applied by the majority. 99 She noted
that the government can circumvent the Jones holding by enlisting factory-installed
or owner-installed tracking devices, (i.e., cell phones) instead of physically attaching
a tracking device.100 Justice Sotomayor stated that the delicate information received
by the GPS to determine “the existence of a reasonable societal expectation of privacy
in the sum of one’s public movements” should be taken into account. 101 This weakened
the Knotts holding, implying that a person may have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in GPS data collected on public roads. She also recognized the difficulty in
determining a reasonable expectation of privacy in society’s present “digital age.” 102
Justice Alito’s concurrence expounded upon the points made by Justice
Sotomayor. Justice Alito found that continuous monitoring of every single movement
of an individual’s car for twenty-eight days violated individuals’ reasonable
expectation of privacy and thus constituted a search.103 He explained that, prior to GPS
devices, a month-long surveillance of an individual would have been demanding and
costly, requiring a tremendous amount of resources and people. 104 As a result, society’s
expectation that such surveillance would not happen to them is reasonable. 105
In Florida v. Jardines, the Supreme Court considered whether using a drugsniffing dog on a homeowner’s porch to investigate the contents of the home was a
search.106 The government entered the home’s front porch with a drug-sniffing dog,
where the dog gave a positive alert for narcotics.107 Based on the alert, the government
obtained a warrant for a search.108 The Court found that a search occurred when law
enforcement entered the front porch using the property-based understanding of the
Fourth Amendment, as it did in Jones.109
In Justice Kagan’s concurrence, she argued that the government would violate
one’s reasonable expectation of privacy “when they use trained canine assistants to
reveal within the confines of a home what they could not otherwise have found
there.”110 Her reasoning focused on the privacy interest one has in their home, citing
Kyllo, and the behavior of the government. 111 She likened the government’s behavior
Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1016 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777–79
(6th Cir. 2012), among other older cases.
99

Jones, 565 U.S. at 414–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

100

Id.

101

Id. at 416.

102

Id. at 417.

103

Id. at 428–31 (Alito, J., concurring).

104

Id.

105

Id.

106

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2016).

107

Id. at 3–4.

108

Id. at 4.

109

Id. at 10–11.

110

Id. at 13 (Kagan, J., concurring).

111

Id. at 14–15.
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to that of a stranger using high-powered binoculars to peer into a house. 112 Such
behavior, she noted, would allow the stranger to learn details of the homeowner’s life
that were disclosed to no one, invading the homeowner’s reasonable expectation of
privacy by “nosing into intimacies . . . sensibly thought protected from disclosure.”113
The Supreme Court in Riley v. California held that the government cannot search
digital information on a cell phone seized from a person without a warrant. 114 In two
separate cases, police officers seized a cell phone from arrested persons, discovering
incriminating information after accessing information on the phones. 115 In finding that
people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone’s digital
information, the Court relied on the pervasiveness of cell phones. 116 “[M]odern cell
phones . . . are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial
visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human
anatomy.”117 “Prior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a cache of sensitive personal information with them as they went about their day. Now it is the person
who is not carrying a cell phone, with all that it contains, who is the exception.” 118 The
Court also found that “[p]rivacy comes at a cost” to law enforcement because
“[m]odern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they
contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of
life[.]’”119
3. Carpenter
In Carpenter, the Court addressed the issue of “whether the [g]overnment conducts
a search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical cell phone records
that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements.” 120 The
government, without obtaining a warrant, collected cell site records from cell phone
carriers that revealed the cell phone’s location. 121 The Court found this a violation of
the Fourth Amendment, holding that “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI.” 122
As part of its holding, the Court declined to extend the third-party doctrine to
historical CSLI.123 First, the Court found a “world of difference” between the types of
112

Id. at 13.

113

Id.

114

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).

115

Id. at 2480–81.

116

Id.

117

Id. at 2484.

118

Id. at 2490.

119

Id. at 2494–95.

120

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018).

121

Id. at 2212.

122

Id. at 2217.

123

Id. at 2220. The third-party doctrine was first established in United States v. Miller, where
the Court held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
turned over to a third party. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). The Court
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personal information addressed in the third-party doctrine and the location information
“casually collected by wireless carriers today.” 124 Second, the Court found that CSLI
“is not truly ‘shared,’” because CSLI is recorded by simply using the phone “without
any affirmative act . . . beyond powering [it] up.”125
In finding a reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court relied on the Jones
concurrences to show an objective expectation of privacy. 126 The Court, as in Jones,
rejected Knotts, finding that “[a] person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment
protection by venturing into the public sphere. To the contrary, ‘what [one] seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.’”127 This negates a mechanical reading of Knotts, specifically in the case of
cell phone location information. Additionally, the Court highlighted the pervasiveness
of cell phones while emphasizing the ease at which the government can collect
historical CSLI.128 The Court noted that this combination is similar to the government
attaching “an ankle monitor to the phone’s user.” 129
Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch each dissented. Justice Kennedy
argued that the majority departed from Fourth Amendment precedent and principles,
and that it “place[d] undue restrictions on the lawful and necessary enforcement
powers” of the government.130 He also believed that the third-party doctrine applied
because cell site records “are no different from the many other kinds of business
records” and users “do not own, possess, control, or use the [location] records.” 131 He
also argued that CSLI is imprecise. 132 Justices Thomas and Alito echoed these
arguments and believed that the legislature should determine whether a warrant
showing probable cause is required for the government to collect historical CSLI, not
the Court.133 Justice Gorsuch’s dissent made three arguments, seemingly believing that
there should be Fourth Amendment protection for CSLI, but didn’t agree with the

determined that Miller’s bank records were not his own but “business records of the bank.” Id.
In a separate case applying the third-party doctrine, Smith v. Maryland, the Court found that
Smith had no expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed on a telephone for similar reasons.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979). The two factors in the third-party doctrine are
voluntary exposure and ownership. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
124

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.

125

Id.

126

Id. at 2217–19.

127

Id. at 2217.

128

Id. at 2218.

129

Id.

130

Id. at 2223 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

131

Id. at 2224, 2229–30.

132

Id. at 2225.

133

Id. at 2246 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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majority in how they came to that conclusion. 134 Like Justices Alito and Thomas, he
also believed the legislature was better suited to address this issue. 135
All of these cases lay the groundwork for real-time cell phone tracking. Prior to
Carpenter, some courts distinguished Jones and applied Knotts, holding that a person
traveling on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements.136 Courts also applied the third-party doctrine.137 However, Carpenter
now makes this logic difficult. Carpenter and the Jones concurrences now control,
and include the principles found in Karo, Kyllo, the Jardines concurrence, and Riley.
III. CURRENT CASE LAW REGARDING CELL PHONE LOCATION INFORMATION
Some courts have analyzed the government’s use of a cell phone’s real-time
location information under the Fourth Amendment. 138 Some require a warrant based
on probable cause before the government can collect such information, while others
have found that a warrant requiring probable cause is not required.139 Specifically,
some courts have held that a cell phone’s user has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in his or her cell phone’s location information. 140 This Section focuses on courts that
have contemplated the legal standard for which the government is permitted to obtain
a cell phone user’s real-time location information. Most of these cases focus on the
collection of real-time cell phone location information. Though others focus on
historical location information, the legal standard should not be different. These courts
have applied or distinguished Jones, as well as other doctrines, resulting in conflicting
rationales and conclusions. These differing opinions can now be resolved under
Carpenter.

134 Id. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The three arguments that Justice Gorsuch made
were to: (1) “ignore the problem, maintain Smith and Miller, and live with the consequences [i]f
the confluence of these decisions and modern technology means our Fourth Amendment rights
are reduced to nearly nothing, so be it[;]” (2) “set Smith and Miller aside and try again using
the Katz ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ jurisprudence that produced them[;]” and (3) “look
for answers elsewhere[, such as bailment and positive law].” Id. at 2262.
135

Id. at 2265–66.

136 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2230–31 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Davis, 785 F.3d at 514–15
(distinguishing Jones from historical CSLI); United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1016 (6th
Cir. 2017).
137 See United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1017–18 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v.
Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511–13 (11th Cir. 2015) (applying the third-party doctrine to historical
CSLI); In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 145–46
(E.D.N.Y. 2013).
138 United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Ellis, 270 F. Supp.
3d 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2017); In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d
129 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Tracey v. Florida, 152 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014).
139

Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 526.

140

United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012 (6th Cir. 2017); In re Smartphone Geolocation
Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
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A. Government Access to Cell Phone Location Information Under the Fourth
Amendment
Requiring the government to obtain a warrant under the Fourth Amendment to
collect real-time cell phone location information is necessitated by Carpenter.141 Some
courts have required such a warrant, however, one remaining issue is whether the
length of surveillance should be a factor.142 In addition to real-time cell phone location
information, it is helpful to analyze lower court cases addressing this issue for
historical cell phone location information.
In one instance, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Graham, held that the
government’s acquisition of historical CSLI without a warrant based on probable
cause was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 143 The court
correctly found that:
Examination of a person’s . . . CSLI [enables] the government to trace the
movements of the cell phone and its user across public and private spaces
and thereby discover the private activities and personal habits of the user.
Cell phone users have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in
this information.144
This holding demonstrates the inapplicability of Knotts. Instead of relying upon
Knotts, the court relied on Karo and Kyllo in recognizing the sanctity of Fourth
Amendment protections in the home. 145 The court found that CSLI “allow[s] the
government to place an individual and her personal property—specifically, her cell
phone—at the person’s home and other private locations at specific points in time.” 146
The precision of CSLI is an important factor, one that the Fourth Circuit correctly
applied in this case.
However, in considering the length of surveillance, the court’s focus was on longterm surveillance.147 The court compared long-term location information disclosed in
cell phone records to the long-term GPS monitoring in Jones, stating that it “can reveal
both a comprehensive view and specific details of the individual’s daily life.” 148
Though this is true, short-term surveillance can be just as revealing. Determining a
cut-off for what is considered long-term surveillance is dangerous because, as found
141

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.

142 See United States v. Ellis, 270 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Tracey v. Florida, 152
So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2014). For cases related to historical CSLI, see United States v. Graham, 796
F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015); In re Application for Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal
Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal 2015); United States v. Thomas, No. 3:15cr80,
2015 WL 5999313 (E.D. Va. Oct. 13, 2015).

Graham, 796 F.3d at 338 (admitting CSLI because “the government relied in good faith
on court orders.”).
143

144

Id. at 344–45.

145

Id. at 346.

146

Id.

147

Id. at 347.

148

Id. at 348. The court determined that long-term monitoring is at least fourteen days. Id.

at 350.
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in Tracey v. Florida, it can result in “arbitrary and inequitable enforcement.” 149 For
this reason, the Florida Supreme Court rejected an approach based on the interval of
time location information was collected.150 The court noted the difficulty for law
enforcement to know whether a warrant is needed if lines were drawn regarding the
length of location information collection.151 The length of surveillance should not be
a factor in determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. A person’s
Fourth Amendment rights can be violated within minutes of tracking via collection of
real-time cell phone location information if such collection is done without a warrant
based on probable cause. Time is not discriminatory. Otherwise, the precedent set in
Graham may result in such “arbitrary and inequitable” enforcement. 152
In Tracey, the Florida Supreme Court found that one has a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his or her real-time location information. 153 The court recognized the
pervasiveness of cell phones, similar to the Supreme Court in Riley.154 In finding a
reasonable expectation of privacy, the court found that “‘a significant portion” of
Americans use cell phones for various purposes, such as email, text-messaging,
scheduling, and banking.155 The court also found that people normally carry cell
phones on their person making “a cell phone’s movements its owner’s movements.” 156
The court acknowledged that this pervasiveness violates the principles in Karo, Kyllo,
and Jardines.157 The court stated that “cell phone tracking can easily invade the right
to privacy in one’s home or other private areas, a matter that the government cannot
always anticipate and one which, when it occurs, is clearly a Fourth Amendment
violation.”158 The court correctly noted it as a violation because the Amendment
protects the rights of United States citizens to be secure in their houses. 159 Second, the
Fourth Amendment requires a warrant that particularly describes the place searched. 160
Without the government knowing precisely where the phone is, tracking a cell phone
without a warrant is akin to a general warrant. Additionally, the court found that cell
phones are more pervasive than the beeper in Knotts because “Knotts did not
knowingly obtain, consciously carry, and purposely use the beeper for all manner of

149

Tracey v. Florida, 152 So. 3d 504, 521 (Fla. 2014).

150

Id. at 521.

151

Id.

152

See United States v. Thomas, No. 3:15cr80, 2015 WL 5999313, at *5 (E.D. Va. Oct. 13,
2015) (relying on Graham in finding that law enforcement “must obtain a warrant before
acquiring long-term historical CSLI.”). Though the court determined a warrant was required,
the precedent set in Graham related to long-term monitoring should be ignored.
153

Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 526.

154

Id. at 524.

155

Id. at 523 (citation omitted).

156

Id. at 525.

157

Id.

158

Id. at 524.

159

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

160

Id.
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personal and necessary functions, as occurs with cell phones.”161 The Court cited Jones
to further distinguish Knotts, making it clear that Knotts is not applicable to real-time
tracking.162
The court also recognized that cell phones automatically connect to cell sites. 163
The court rejected the argument that an individual voluntarily turns over his or her
location information, finding that users do not “convey [real-time CSLI] to the service
provider for any purpose other than to enable use of his cell phone for its intended
purpose.”164 The court also noted that “[r]equiring a cell phone user to turn off the cell
phone just to assure privacy from governmental intrusion . . . places an unreasonable
burden on the user to forego necessary use of his cell phone, a device now considered
essential by much of the populace.”165 The Florida Supreme Court correctly found a
reasonable expectation of privacy, relying on the pervasiveness of cell phones, the
inapplicability of Knotts, the Jones concurrences, the involuntary conveyance of realtime CSLI, and the need to disregard the length of surveillance.
In United States v. Ellis, the government monitored defendant’s cell phone in realtime.166 The United States District Court for the Northern District of California held
that “cell phone users have an expectation of privacy in their cell phone location in
real time and that society is prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable.” 167
The court determined, similar to the Tracey court, that individuals “keep their phones
on their person or within reach[,]” making cell phones “a close proxy to one’s actual
physical location.”168 The court adopted the reasoning in In Re: Application for
Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation169 (“Telephone
Information”) to come to this conclusion—a case where the court affirmed the denial
of the government’s application to obtain historical CSLI.170 The Telephone
Information court found the following principles present in the government’s request
for historical CSLI:
(1) an individual’s expectation of privacy is at its pinnacle when
government surveillance intrudes on the home; (2) long-term electronic
surveillance by the government implicates an individual’s expectation of
privacy; and (3) location data generated by cell phones, which are

161

Tracey, 152 So. 3d at 524.

162

Id. at 525.

163

Id. at 507.

164

Id. at 525.

165

Id. at 523.

166

United States v. Ellis, 270 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2017).

167

Id. at 1145.

168

Id.

169

In re Application for Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F.
Supp. 3d 1011, 1023–25 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
170

Ellis, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 1145–46.
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ubiquitous in this day and age, can reveal a wealth of private information
about an individual.171
Other than a focus on long-term surveillance, which should not be a factor, the court’s
rationale was similar to that in Tracey.
When discussing the ubiquity of cell phones, the Telephone Information court
found persuasive the fact that CSLI is “generated by passive activities” such as
connecting to a base station, apps running in the background, and the receipt of calls
and text messages.172 The court also noted, correctly, that “even though a user may
demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy by disabling an app’s location
identification features,” the phone still generates CSLI. 173 The court also rejected any
notion of discarding or turning off cell phones. 174 The fact that “cell phones are not a
luxury good” but “an essential part of living in modern society[,]” is exactly the reason
why individuals should not have to “choose between maintaining their Fourth
Amendment right . . . and using a device that has become so integral to functioning in
today’s society.”175 The court acknowledged that “it is untenable to force individuals
to disconnect from society just so they can avoid having their movements
subsequently tracked by the government.” 176 Specifically, the court held:
[U]nless a person is willing to live ‘off the grid,’ it is nearly impossible to
avoid disclosing the most personal of information . . . on a constant basis,
just to navigate daily life. And the thought that the government should be
able to access such information without the basic protection that a warrant
offers is nothing less than chilling.177
The courts in these cases were correct in their findings, using the original purpose
of the Fourth Amendment as its guide—to prevent a police state and thwart arbitrary
government power.
B. Big Brother’s False Hope: Unbound Government Access to Cell Phone Location
Information
Some courts have found that a warrant under the Fourth Amendment is not
required to collect real-time cell phone location information.178 The reasoning used in
these cases conflict with Carpenter by relying on the third-party doctrine and ignoring
the role cell phones play in today’s society. These cases cannot be relied upon when
addressing future cases where the government requests real-time cell phone location
information without a warrant showing probable cause.
171 In re Application for Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F.
Supp. 3d at 1022.
172

Id. at 1024.

173

Id. at 1025.

174

Id. at 1035–36.

175

Id. at 1035.

176

Id. at 1036.

177

Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted).

178

See United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012 (6th Cir. 2017); In re Smartphone Geolocation
Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
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In United States v. Riley (“Riley 6th Cir.”), the Sixth Circuit held that individuals
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their real-time location information.179
The court relied on a Sixth Circuit case in which the Sixth Circuit held that an
individual has no “reasonable expectation of privacy in the GPS data and location of
his cell phone” when he “voluntarily use[s]” it. 180 The Sixth Circuit leaned heavily
upon its precedent, incorrectly stating that one must turn off his or her cell phone to
avoid ever-present monitoring.181 The court also relied upon Knotts, erroneously
believing that “because ‘the defendant’s movements could have been observed by any
member of the public,’” he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his real-time
CSLI.182
In a separate case, In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, the court held
that individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their real-time location
information.183 The court found that prospective CSLI fell under the third-party
doctrine.184 The court relied on the assumption that a cell phone user is “well aware”
that the phone uses location information and can turn off the phone to stop it from
doing so.185 In In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, as with Riley 6th Cir.,
the court focused on the assumption that cell phone users voluntarily convey their realtime CSLI, therefore waiving any reasonable expectation of privacy in such
information.186
The reasoning in these cases is flawed. Real-time CSLI does not fall under the
third-party doctrine, as evidenced by Carpenter rejecting its application to historical
CSLI.187 Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor alluded to the inapplicability of the thirdparty doctrine to GPS tracking in her Jones concurrence by stating that it is “ill-suited
to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves
to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.” 188 Additionally, location
information is not always voluntarily conveyed; and “[i]ndividuals cannot be
179

Riley, 858 F.3d at 1013.

180 Id. at 1013, 1017 (citing United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir.)); see also
Matthew DeVoy Jones, The “Orwellian Consequence” of Smartphone Tracking: Why a
Warrant Under the Fourth Amendment Is Required Prior to Collection of GPS Data from
Smartphones, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 211 (2014) (arguing that Skinner’s position is incorrect).
181

Riley, 858 F.3d at 1018.

182 Id. at 1017; see also United States v. Wallace, 857 F.3d 685, 690–91 (5th Cir. 2017)
(decision substituted by United States v. Wallace, 885 F.3d 806). In Wallace the Fifth Circuit
found that prospective CSLI fell under the third-party doctrine, in addition to relying upon Sixth
Circuit precedent. The decision which substituted this finding decided not to address whether
obtaining prospective CSLI constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Wallace, 885 F.3d at 810.
183

See In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 147 (E.D.N.Y.

2013).
184

Id. at 146.

185

Id. at 146–47.

186

Id. at 147.

187

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).

188

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012).
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compelled to choose between maintaining their Fourth Amendment right to privacy in
their location and using a device that has become so integral to functioning in today’s
society.”189 For these reasons, neither Riley 6th Cir. nor In re Smartphone Geolocation
Data Application can be looked to for guidance. The arguments made in these cases
will be struck down, respectfully, in Section IV.
IV. REQUIRING A WARRANT UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT FOR REAL-TIME CELL
PHONE LOCATION INFORMATION
This Section argues that a warrant based on probable cause is required prior to the
government’s collection of real-time cell phone location information to locate an
individual. First, this Section counters arguments made in Riley 6th Cir., In re
Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, and the Carpenter dissents. This Section
then explains that Fourth Amendment legal standards apply to real-time cell phone
location information.
A. Rejecting Arguments that a Warrant Under the Fourth Amendment Is Not
Required to Collect Real-Time Cell Phone Location Information
Many arguments have been made as to why cell phone users should not have any
expectation of privacy, subjectively or objectively, in the real-time location
information collected from their phone. Many of these arguments were made prior to
Carpenter. Due to the fallacy of these arguments, a warrant pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment is required.
The most common argument against one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his
or her real-time cell phone location information is that such information is voluntarily
conveyed to a third-party, and as such, the user has no ownership interest in the
location information.190 This argument ignores that such information is not always
conveyed voluntarily. Real-time cell phone location information is voluntarily
conveyed when the user overtly makes a call, sends a text or email, or posts his or her
location on an app.191 Yet, this information is not voluntarily conveyed when a user
receives calls, texts, or emails, or apps are running in the background. 192 Even though
location information may be “voluntarily” conveyed, it is often not the intention of the
user. The user makes an intentional act that causes the cell phone to connect to a tower,
and therefore reveal real-time location information. However, the information was
revealed to use the phone for its intended purpose, not to share his or her location. A
cell phone user cannot be said to “voluntarily” convey to his or her service provider
information that was generated by the service provider without the user’s involvement.
Even more important in striking down this argument, Carpenter did not extend the
third-party doctrine to historical CSLI.193 The Court seconded Justice Sotomayor in
189 In re Application for Telephone Information Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F.
Supp. 3d 1011, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
190 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223–24 (2018) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2235
(Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2247 (Alito, J., dissenting); United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d
1012, 1017–18 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511–13 (11th Cir. 2015);
In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 145-46 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
191

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210.

192

Id.

193

Id.
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Jones, where she stated that the third-party doctrine was “ill-suited to the digital age,
in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in
the course of carrying out mundane tasks.” 194 This reasoning also applies to real-time
cell phone location information because users convey location information while
simply carrying the phone on their person. People use cell phones for “mundane tasks”
such as communicating with family, accessing the Internet, checking account
balances, and for a growing number of other reasons. Because real-time cell phone
location information can be conveyed without the user doing anything more than
turning the phone on, it is incorrect to apply the third-party doctrine to such
information. Turning off one’s cell phone does not resolve the problem of one wanting
to keep his or her location information private either. As previously noted, nearly all
Americans own a cell phone, cell phones are constantly kept on one’s person or closeby, and living without a cell phone would make life difficult as cell phones are such
an important part of today’s world. To require a cell phone user to turn off his or her
phone in order to shield himself or herself from unconstitutional government intrusion
is not the act of a free country. No one buys a cell phone to share detailed information
about his or her whereabouts with the government. Because this information is easily
collected by wireless carriers and reveals a “detailed chronicle of a person’s physical
presence,” the fact that a third party holds this information is irrelevant. 195
Moreover, the detailed location information is not of the same type considered by
the third-party doctrine. The information considered in the third-party doctrine—
telephone and bank records, among others—does not reveal such a “detailed
chronicle” of an individual’s physical presence as does real-time cell phone location
information. It is true that telephone and bank records may reveal private associations;
however, such records do not show that the person actually attended any private
meetings, appointments, or political rallies. As such, records under the third-party
doctrine have certain limitations, where the “detailed and comprehensive record of the
[cell phone user’s] movements” collected through real-time cell phone location
information presents no limitation to what such information can reveal.196 The records
that fall under the third-party doctrine focus on points in time where an individual
affirmatively uses technology, whereas real-time cell phone location information is
constantly generated, at times, without any affirmative act by its user. Carpenter noted
this “unique nature of cell phone location records” stating that such records
“implicates privacy concerns far beyond those considered in [the third-party
doctrine].”197 In fact, when the third-party doctrine was first introduced “in 1979, few
could have imagined a society in which a phone goes wherever its owner goes,
conveying . . . a detailed and comprehensive record of the person’s movements.” 198
Another argument against applying the Fourth Amendment is that the warrantless
collection of location information serves a compelling government interest. This
argument was made by Justices Kennedy and Alito in Carpenter in relation to

194

Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

195

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.

196

Id. at 2217.

197

Id. at 2220.

198

Id. at 2217.
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historical CSLI.199 Both believed that requiring a warrant based on probable cause
unreasonably burdens the government to the advantage of criminals. 200 They argued
that CSLI is used to establish probable cause and that requiring a warrant would cause
“[m]any investigations to sputter out at the start.” 201
There is no doubt that law enforcement tactics must advance with technological
changes and that apprehending criminals is an important government interest.
However, this advancement and interest must not come at the expense of personal
liberties. If law enforcement tactics advance, so too must the protections guaranteed
under the Fourth Amendment. Otherwise, the government could circumvent the
Constitution, eliciting “Orwellian consequences” contrary to American liberty and
freedom. As Justice Sotomayor noted in her concurrence in Jones, “because GPS
monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by
design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive
law enforcement practices: ‘limited police resources and community hostility.’” 202
“Much like GPS monitoring, cell phone tracking is remarkably easy, cheap, and
efficient compared to traditional investigative tools. With just the click of a button, the
[g]overnment can access each carrier’s deep repository of historical location
information at practically no expense.” 203 This outweighs any government interest in
apprehending criminals because it presents opportunity for abuse. As noted by
Carpenter, the warrantless collection of cell phone location information risks
“[g]overnment encroachment of the sort the Framers, ‘after consulting the lessons of
history,’ drafted the Fourth Amendment to prevent.” 204 This is important because, as
previously mentioned, the purpose of the Amendment is to curb arbitrary government
power. Allowing the government warrantless collection of this information would
place “‘the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.’” 205
Further, requiring a warrant will not limit the effectiveness of law enforcement in
solving crimes. Warrants can be obtained without the use of real-time cell phone
location information. In fact, law enforcement has obtained warrants without such
information for centuries. Though it may be an additional step in the government’s

199

See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2256 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
200 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2256 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
201 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2256 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
202

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415–16 (2012).

203

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.

204

Id. at 2223.

205 Brief of Scholars of the History and Original Meaning of the Fourth Amendment as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 11, 20, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2206 (citing James Otis).
Referring back to the introductory scenario, let’s assume a police officer was very fond of Mrs.
Jeffries and, as a result, hated Mr. Jeffries. The officer could either follow Mrs. Jeffries using
her phone’s real-time location information to know her whereabouts in hopes of
“coincidentally” running into her. The officer could also follow Mr. Jeffries using his phone’s
real-time location information to confront him or devise a plan to make him look guilty of a
crime.
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process, technology has aided the government in obtaining warrants faster and more
efficiently.206
Additionally, the Fourth Amendment already accounts for any burden that the
warrant requirement may pose to law enforcement by allowing warrantless searches
and seizures under certain circumstances.207 Requiring a warrant based on probable
cause, therefore, does not impede law enforcement’s task of arresting criminals.
Neither is it unreasonable to require the government to obtain a warrant based on
probable cause because warrants are required for other types of searches and
seizures.208 Real-time cell phone location information should be no different. Due to
the information that can be gleaned from real-time cell phone location information,
the ease in which the government can collect it, and the protections in place to prevent
any burden the warrant requirement may present to law enforcement, it is clear that a
warrant is needed to curb the government’s power as required by the Framer’s intent.
“Privacy comes at a cost”—the warrant requirement is an important function of
American government, not an inconvenience to be weighed against claims of law
enforcement efficiency.209
Another argument presented by Justice Kennedy is that after Carpenter, the
government will not know what information it can and cannot collect without a
warrant.210 I respectfully disagree. Carpenter clearly states that a warrant is required
to obtain historical CSLI.211 The same would be true for real-time cell phone location
information. If law enforcement were to follow Carpenter, it would understand that
because the third-party doctrine was not extended to historical CSLI, it would not
extend to any similar information, such as real-time cell phone location information,
that would allow the government to obtain private and detailed information with
minimal effort.212
Another common argument is that CSLI does not reveal any private information
about an individual.213 Justice Kennedy argued that CSLI is imprecise, unlike GPS,
and at its most precise reveals a user’s location within an area covering a dozen city
206

See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (citing Missouri v. McNeely, 569
U.S. 141, 152–56 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). In McNeely,
Chief Justice Roberts stated that “police officers can e-mail warrant requests to judges’ iPads
[and] judges have signed such warrants and e-mailed them back to officers in less than 15
minutes.” McNeely, 569 U.S. at 152–56.
207

See supra text accompanying note 65.

208 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (holding that the government’s
physical intrusion required a warrant); see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001)
(police obtained a warrant to search defendant’s home).
209

Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494–95.

210

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

211

Id. at 2221.

212

In addition to real-time cell phone location information, the third-party doctrine will not
apply to “smart” devices, such as Alexa. Arguments for excluding “smart” devices from the
third-party doctrine is that they are located in one’s home and can reveal detailed information
similar to that of a cell phone.
213

United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 516 (11th Cir. 2015); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at
2225, 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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blocks.214 This is simply untrue. In some instances, CSLI is nearly as precise as GPS,
and in highly populated areas, a cell phone can reveal location information within the
nearest foot.215 In fact, precision will continue to grow as more cell sites are put into
operation. For instance, in 2017 a record number of cell sites were in operation. 216
Additionally, GPS can create a precise location of a cell phone within fifteen feet. 217
This fact, then, erases any doubt that real-time cell phone location information does
not reveal any private information about an individual. Because individuals
“compulsively carry” their phone on their person, and location information is precise
and continues to grow even more precise, people can be located within feet of their
physical location.218 Based on determining one’s location, the government can
determine an individual’s habits, beliefs, and affiliations. For example, the CPD was
able to determine that Mr. and Mrs. Jefferies visited tourist attractions during their
stay in Chicago. It is not unlikely that the CPD also determined what food the Jeffries’
preferred, whether they attended any religious ceremonies or participated in ongoing
protests during their visit because their phones followed them “beyond public
thoroughfares and into . . . potentially revealing locales.”219
An additional argument, advanced by Riley 6th Cir. and Justice Kennedy, is that
Jones is not applicable to the collection of cell phone location information. 220 The
focus of this argument revolves around the differences between the methods used to
collect information, specifically direct government involvement versus judicial
intervention, and GPS versus CSLI. It is true that there was a physical trespass in Jones
and there is not when the government collects CSLI. It is also true that GPS is different
than CSLI. However, such distinctions do not render Jones inapplicable in cases where
the government collects real-time cell phone location information. Much like GPS
monitoring, real-time cell phone location information can reveal a comprehensive and
detailed record of an individual’s daily life. 221 Real-time cell phone location
information may reveal more private material than GPS, because cell phones are
carried on one’s person unlike the GPS in Jones. Further, allowing the government to
access such information, without a Constitutional check by the judiciary, is
problematic. It allows the government to gather location information without knowing
“in advance whether they want to follow a particular individual, or when.” 222 “Only
the few without cell phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.” 223
214

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2225, 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

215

Id. at 2233.

216

Andy Szal, US Mobile Date Use, Cell Cites Set New Records in 2017, Industry Group
Says, ECN (July 11, 2018), https://www.ecnmag.com/news/2018/07/us-mobile-data-use-cellsites-set-new-records-2017-industry-group-says.
217

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2225.

218

See id. at 2218 (majority opinion).

219

Id.

220

See id. at 2231 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); United States v. Riley, 858 F.3d 1012, 1016
(6th Cir. 2017).
221

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.

222

Id. at 2218.

223

Id.
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B. Following the Signals: Fourth Amendment Case Law
Katz, Knotts, Karo, Kyllo, Jones, Jardines, Riley, and Carpenter have laid the
foundation for addressing the issue of the warrantless collection of real-time cell phone
location information. These cases recognize that a search occurs when: a person
expects privacy in the thing searched or seized, and society believes that expectation
is reasonable; or the government trespasses on a searched or seized person’s
property.224 In the case of nearly all cell phone users, the government does not place a
device on or in the suspect’s phone to follow their movements. Rather, the phone emits
signals to cell service providers’ “base stations” while also containing a factoryembedded GPS device.225 Because there is no trespass by the government, the Jones
concurrences and Carpenter control, as both applied the Katz reasonable expectation
of privacy test.
1. Untying Knotts from Real-Time Cell Phone Location Information Monitoring
Applying Knotts to cases where real-time cell phone location information is
collected by the government should cease. Knotts should not apply to such cases
because the facts in Knotts are clearly distinguishable and Jones and Carpenter have
effectively rendered Knotts inapplicable to such cases.
If Knotts were applied to real-time cell phone location information, the
government would be permitted to track an individual through the use of a cell phone
emitting real-time location information. This would mean that whenever cell phone
users are carrying their cell phones on their person in public, which nearly all do, the
government could legally follow their every move without any check on its ability to
do so. It would grant the government permission to track a person and discover every
place he or she goes, without particularly describing the location of the person they
intend to track, and in some instances who to track, or providing probable cause of
any wrongdoing. Distinguishing Knotts is therefore essential.
Knotts is distinguishable because cell phones blur the distinction between public
and private places, emitting signals from both places, whereas the GPS in Knotts was
placed onto the car specifically for the purpose of tracking the defendant, which could
only be done in public.226 The government in Knotts, therefore, could only track the
defendant on public roads, whereas currently, the government has no way of knowing,
in advance, whether it is monitoring a person’s phone in public or private. This violates
Karo, which prevents the government from monitoring a tracking device in a private
residence.227 This also violates the principles in Kyllo and Jardines, which highlight
the privacy interests one has in his or her home. 228 Even if a person was in public,
224 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406–07 (2012); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
225

Herbert, supra note 40, at 477 (citing Darren Handler, An Island of Chaos Surrounded
by a Sea of Confusion: The E911 Wireless Device Location Initiative, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH 1
(2005)); see also Herbert, supra note 45, at 34 (stating that most smart phones are “preloaded
with GPS-enabled technology”).
226

United States v. Knotts, 440 U.S. 276, 278 (1983).

227

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984).

228

See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 45 (2001); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 14
(2016) (Kagan, J., concurring).
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however, as Justice Sotomayor and the majority in Jones concluded, a person might
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their public movements. 229 Justices
Sotomayor and Alito concluded that continuous monitoring of individuals’ public
movements violates their reasonable expectation of privacy. 230 After the Jones
decision, the rule expressed in Knotts was substantially weakened.
Carpenter weakened Knotts further. The Court recognized that Knotts does not
apply to historical CSLI because individuals “compulsively carry cell phones with
them all the time” which allows the government to track a cell phone user’s location
with “near perfect surveillance, as if it ha[d] attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s
user.”231 This inescapabilty of cell phone technology further separates Knotts from
real-time cell phone location information. If the government could track individuals
from the comfort of an office chair without requiring a warrant, only the hermit would
have an advantage. “A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by
venturing into the public sphere. To the contrary, ‘what [one] seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.’”232
As with historical CSLI, real-time cell phone location information reveals “a
detailed chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled . . . every moment” of
every day.233 It is clear that Knotts has run its course and is no longer applicable to
such cases, as expressed in Jones and Carpenter, because tracking individuals without
a warrant based on probable cause on public thoroughfares results in a reasonable
breach of privacy in individuals’ public movements. “Allowing government access to
cell-site records contravenes [society’s] expectation” that law enforcement could not,
and would not, “secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement” of an
individual.234 Knotts, therefore, cannot be applied for the aforementioned reasons.
2. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Real-Time Cell Phone Location
Information
Katz provides the two-step inquiry of whether there are subjective and objective
expectations of privacy.235 The first inquiry, the subjective question, is fact based and
can be determined by looking at whether the individual who claimed a violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights actually believed he had privacy rights in the location
information emanating from his cell phone. It has been argued that the subjective
prong is no longer addressed by courts. 236 Case law appears to support this argument,
however, it is still important to discuss.
Many individuals are unaware that making or receiving a call or text message, or
using apps on their cell phone will create a record of their whereabouts, which clearly
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weighs in favor of finding a subjective expectation of privacy. 237 However, more cell
phone users are becoming aware that such activity does create a location record.
Although this fact is known, individuals with such knowledge may still have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their real-time cell phone location information,
even when such a belief is erroneous. 238 Not recognizing an expectation of privacy
when one knows that their privacy can be infringed upon will eventually result in no
privacy expectations as technology becomes more invasive. For instance, innocent
bystanders to a crime, such as the Jeffries, may understand that they can be tracked
for days by the government, but because they committed no crime, the expectation is
that their movements will not be tracked. Therefore, knowledge that cell phones create
a location record should not mean that individuals lack a subjective expectation of
privacy in their smartphone’s GPS data.
Further, the fact that cell phone users accept terms and conditions does not negate
a subjective expectation of privacy. Many service provider and app terms and
conditions are lengthy and difficult for a reasonable person to understand. For this
reason, the vast majority of cell phone users accept terms and conditions without even
reading them. Additionally, the privacy policies of the four largest service providers
in the United States do not state that location information will be collected by the
government in cases other than emergencies. Only one policy states that location
information may be disclosed to the government when served with lawful process. So
even if terms and conditions are read, there is no disclosure to users, absent the one
provider, stating that location information will be willingly shared with the
government. Taken together, it is within the realm of reason that individuals have a
subjective expectation of privacy in their real-time cell phone location information.
The second inquiry, the objective question, is more difficult to address. Whether
there is an objective expectation of privacy, or whether society believes that an
individual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable, will change over time. The vast
majority of individuals with cell phones carry their phones on their person, in essence,
creating a tracking device that they carry with them at all times. 239 This allows the
government to achieve near perfect surveillance of the location of a cell phone without
concern about who is carrying the phone, where the phone is located, or whether
government agents are actively monitoring the phone. 240 It grants the government the
opportunity to trace an individual’s every movement without any obstacles. 241 This
means that real-time cell phone location information provides information twenty-four
hours a day, encouraging “broad and indiscriminate” law enforcement practices. 242 It
is hard to argue, that as Americans, we would expect, or should accept, such law
237
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enforcement practices, “condemning each of us to live in fear that we could be
surveilled at any time or all the time.” 243
In addition to there being a clear objective expectation of privacy, there are
supplementary concerns that weigh in favor of an objective expectation of privacy.
One such concern is that a person may be in his or her home when the location
information is collected. Collecting this information while the phone’s user is in his
or her home violates Karo. It also implicates Kyllo and the Jardines concurrence, in
that location information reveals details that could not otherwise be obtained absent a
warrant. The only way to ensure that an individual is not in a private residence is to
take note of this through visual surveillance. Without visual surveillance, law
enforcement would not know whether someone is in a private residence. Requiring a
warrant based on probable cause easily circumvents the problem of collecting realtime cell phone location information while in a private residence.
Another concern is that real-time cell phone location information, like GPS data
and historical CSLI, “is detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled.” 244 As
Carpenter noted, this “time-stamped data provides an intimate window into a person’s
life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his ‘familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations’” because “[a] cell phone
faithfully follows its owner beyond public thoroughfares and into private residences,
doctor’s offices, political headquarters, and other potentially revealing locales.” 245
Decades ago, “few could have imagined a society in which a phone goes wherever its
owner goes, conveying to the wireless carrier . . . a detailed and comprehensive record
of the person’s movements.”246 This compilation of “public” information from
continual collection of real-time cell phone location information gives the government
information that a normal person could not otherwise obtain. In essence, it is similar
to having a person that you do not know follow you for hours, days, or weeks on end,
or permitting the government to place a tracking device on your person. It is extremely
unlikely that anyone would condone and welcome such behavior. For example, when
a stranger sees a person running, the stranger may infer that the individual is conscious
of his or her health, but little more. When the government has this same information,
collected through real-time tracking, the government can make inferences that the
stranger cannot. This is a clear invasion of privacy.247 Continuous monitoring was
addressed in Jones, where Justice Alito stated that it violates an objective expectation
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of privacy and thus constitutes a search.248 Carpenter furthered the rationale in Jones,
applying it to cell phones.249
Though Carpenter’s issue was one of the government’s “ability to chronicle a
person’s past movements through the record of his cell phone signals[,]” 250 and
specifically did not express any views on real-time tracking,251 the decision and its
supporting arguments make Carpenter the definitive case as it relates to tracking
individuals using real time cell phone location information. First, it took into account
the most recent Supreme Court rulings and rationale, applying the principles from
those cases to historical cell phone location information. 252 For instance, the Court
relied on Riley to highlight the pervasiveness of cell phones and their vast storage
capacity of sensitive information,253 Kyllo to emphasize that the government, absent a
warrant, could not capitalize on new technology to explore what was happening within
the home,254 and the Jones concurrences to support its holding that individuals have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements because
such information holds the privacies of life.255 Carpenter’s reliance on Jones is
important because it can also be used to support real-time cell phone location
information.256 In fact, real-time cell phone location information includes GPS. 257
An additional concern is abuse of power by the government. This was discussed
in Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Jones:258
[T]he Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal
private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse. The net result is that GPS
monitoring [gives law enforcement] a relatively low cost and substantial
quantum of intimate information about any person whom the government,
in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track, and may “alter the relationship
between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic
society.259
She further stated that this unwelcomed power would defeat the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment.
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Justice Sotomayor’s description of the government sounds eerily similar to the one
in George Orwell’s novel, 1984.260 In 1984, Orwell wrote,
[T]he telescreen received and transmitted simultaneously . . . . There was
of course no way of knowing whether you were being watched at any given
moment. How often, or on what system, the [police] plugged in on any
individual wire was guesswork. It was even conceivable that they watched
everybody all the time. But at any rate they could plug in your wire
whenever they wanted to. You had to live—did live, from habit that became
instinct—in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and,
except in darkness, every movement scrutinized. 261
Although Orwell’s recital may seem extreme or farfetched science fiction, it no longer
is. Orwell’s telescreen is the modern-day cell phone. It receives and transmits radio
signals simultaneously by connecting to base stations. There is no way to know
whether the government is “watching” you by collecting real-time cell phone location
information, or at what location they are gathering such information. It is even
conceivable that they “watch” everybody all the time. In fact, smart televisions,
refrigerators, personal assistants, and other smart devices are increasingly becoming
the norm. Add that with the fact that law enforcement can monitor cell phone users’
every move at any given moment, and it is recognizable that what was written as
science fiction is not such anymore. 262
Also relevant to the concern of government abuse are the reasons the Framers
drafted the Amendment, despite the fact that cell phones and real-time location
information were not in existence during its creation. Not requiring a warrant based
on probable cause permits the government to obtain real-time cell phone location
information without particularly describing the location of the person they intend to
track, while at the same time monitoring any place that the cell phone user goes—
possibly not knowing who the person is, only the associated phone number. 263 Not
requiring a warrant or probable cause may also allow the government to track a person
without describing any connection to the crime investigated.264 Such behavior would
resemble the government’s use of general warrants during colonial America and the
fear of the Framers—a too permeating police force.
The precise reason the Amendment was adopted was to curb the use of general
warrants, not permit them to occur hundreds of years later. 265 James Madison believed
that “there are more instances of the abridgement of freedom of the people by gradual
and silent encroachments by those in power than by violent and sudden
usurpations.”266 Further, as established by the Florida Supreme Court:
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[T]he ease with which the government, armed with current and everexpanding technology, can now monitor and track our cell phones, and thus
ourselves, with minimal expenditure of funds and manpower, is just the
type of ‘gradual and silent encroachment’ into the very details of our lives
that we as a society must be vigilant to prevent. 267
It is therefore clear that the original intent of the Fourth Amendment protects society
against the warrantless collection of real-time cell phone location information.
It is apparent that when the government uses real-time cell phone location
information to locate an individual, that person has a subjective and, more importantly,
an objective expectation of privacy in this location information. Therefore, there exists
an objective expectation of privacy, which raises concerns about what information the
government collects and why it is collected, implicating the Fourth Amendment and
requiring a warrant based on probable cause.
V. SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE OF WARRANTLESS COLLECTION OF REAL-T IME CELL
PHONE LOCATION INFORMATION
There are two proposed solutions to ensure that individuals’ Fourth Amendment
rights are not violated by the warrantless collection of real-time cell phone location
information. The first option is for the United States Supreme Court to take up the
issue that it avoided in Carpenter. The second option is for Congress to pass legislation
regarding such information. Failing to resolve this matter could result in violations of
the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, federal case law is conflicted on this issue,
which may result in bad law becoming precedent in a growing area of jurisprudence.
It is through either of these solutions that the proper protections will be afforded to the
vast majority of United States citizens.
A. Legislature
The most agreeable solution is for Congress to pass legislation dealing with the
government’s collection of real-time cell phones location information. Justice Alito
stated in Jones that, “[i]n circumstances involving dramatic technological change, the
best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.” 268 For one, Congress is better
situated than the courts to gauge public attitudes. 269 Additionally, Congress can draw
detailed lines and balance privacy and public safety better than the courts. 270
“Because the collection and storage of cell-site records affects nearly every
American, it is unlikely that the question whether the current law requires
strengthening will escape Congress’s notice.”271 Members of Congress must fulfill
their duties and listen to their constituents, rather than their donors, and address this
issue. If Congress fails to act, the Supreme Court will have to continue to restrict the
third-party doctrine and to expand Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to include real-

267

Id.

268

United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting).

269

Id.

270

Id. at 429–30.

271

Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2261 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss4/6

34

CELL PHONES ARE ORWELL’S TELESCREEN

2019]

557

time cell phone location information. As Justice Alito stated in Carpenter,
“[l]egislation is much preferable.”272
B. Judiciary
The Court must follow the Jones concurrences and Carpenter until Congress acts
on real-time cell phone location information. Any case regarding real-time cell phone
location information should simply refuse to extend the third-party doctrine to realtime cell phone location information, since the rationale in Carpenter would apply.
The decision should not take into account the length of time an individual is
monitored, as short-term cell phone monitoring presents the same Fourth Amendment
concerns as long-term monitoring. Nor should a distinction be made between GPS and
real-time CSLI emanating from the cell phone, as discussed in Section IV.
One possible issue with this approach is if there is a plurality opinion, as in Jones,
which could cause some confusion. This may be likely as the Court continues its
change under the current administration.
Another possible issue is that the Court may have already opened the door to more
litigation in finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in historical CSLI. It may have
also limited one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in other location information,
such as real-time cell phone location information, as its holding in Carpenter was
narrow, and lower courts have incorrectly applied case law to the government’s
collection of real-time cell phone location information. This could actually limit one’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in real-time cell phone location information if lower
courts distinguish Carpenter or rely on previous lower court rulings. For these reasons,
the Court must take on a case involving the warrantless monitoring of real-time cell
phone location information until Congress acts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Technological advancements are continuing to modify and influence criminal law.
Cell phones provide individuals greater access to the world, while also providing the
government greater access into individuals’ private lives. It is important that the law
surrounding real-time cell phone location information advance with technology to
protect people in society, like the Jeffries couple and Mr. Rivera-Guerrero. In their
situation, a warrant based on probable cause should have been obtained prior to the
collection of their real-time cell phone location information. To do otherwise reduces
Fourth Amendment protections and raises privacy concerns.
This Article argued that a warrant pursuant to the Fourth Amendment is required
before the government can monitor an individual by collecting the real-time cell phone
location information from the individual’s phone. Section II presented a legal
background of information, focusing on the Fourth Amendment and Supreme Court
case law dealing with the government’s electronic surveillance of individuals. Section
III presented recent case law on law enforcement’s collection of cell phone location
information. Section IV explained why a warrant based on probable cause is required
to collect such information, focusing on legal and public policy arguments. Section V
illustrated two concrete solutions to resolve this problem.
To uphold individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights, it is necessary that a warrant
under the Fourth Amendment be required prior to the government’s collection of realtime cell phone location information emanating from any cell phone. To do otherwise
272
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is accepting Orwell’s “Big Brother” government as our own—allowing law
enforcement to “watch” our every move using our “telescreens.” Jones laid the
foundation by refusing to apply Knotts, weakening Knotts’ holding, as well as the
arguments of the courts that relied on it. Carpenter took it further and found a
reasonable expectation of privacy in historical CSLI. The Fourth Amendment and case
law require a warrant based on probable cause, ensuring constitutional protection for
the United States’ citizenry. For these reasons, a warrant based on probable cause
under the Fourth Amendment must be obtained before law enforcement can track an
individual by obtaining the real-time cell phone location information emanating from
his or her cell phone.
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